Killing Two Birds with One Stone? Doubts on Eerie Official Silence amid Vietnam's Anti-China Protests
The on-and-off confrontation between China and her various naval neighbors over territorial disputes in the South China Sea has once again reared its ugly head. The author previously reported being in the Philippines during previous clashes of Chinese and Filipino forces, and this time, it is Vietnam's turn to hate on the Chinese encroachment. A Chinese building of oil rig in disputed waters led to heavy popular backlash on the Vietnamese streets, with vicious gangs targeting anyone Chinese looking for physical punishment in what can only be described as revenge attacks by vigilantes.
Only in the last day or so has the Vietnamese authorities stepped in to contain the enraged and violent crowds. For the author's perspective, the progression of events has a couple of interesting points. First is that Taiwanese factories have been taking the brunt of the Vietnamese crowds' wrath, as opposed to, say, those corporate and official institutions of Chinese and ethnic Chinese ownership. Second is that, given the Vietnamese government's tight control over public demonstrations, how the enraged public released the rage might say much about Sino-Vietnamese relations.
As much of a conspiracy theory as it seems (just as the author discussed previously for the Malaysian Airlines flight 370), there is a feeling that the street protests in Vietnam became not what it is organically by, at least partially, directed by the Vietnamese government to proceed in a certain fashion. After all, there has been anti-China protests in the past, but they have been largely under the government's control, so much so that with the government's decision to halt, the crowds seemed to have disappeared quickly. The author does not expect anything differently for this round of anti-China protests.
And let's not for a moment doubt the need for the protests to take place and the anger released. The Vietnamese government, being authoritarian and ideologically confused as it is, must under undertake actions that appeals to popular nationalism. Just as it is the case for the Chinese government, looking tough to neighbors on the issues of border disputes would very much serve this goal. Such domestic political concerns will ensure that the Vietnamese government will tolerate the masses to get violent to a certain extent if the situation remains controllable. Certainly China understands this domestic constraint as well.
But at the same time, the Vietnamese government also has international constraints, most important of which to not enlarge the confrontation with China. As multiple sources have pointed out, Vietnam has neither the economic or military resources to hunker down for a lengthy standoff with China without putting itself in an increasing position of weakness. Given China's equal unwillingness to enlarge the conflict after successfully planting its oil rig, both sides would have had some sort of unwritten compromise to shove the whole incident under the proverbial carpet in the very near future.
And that is where the Taiwanese factories come into the picture. It is almost too perfect to be used as a scapegoat. Hiring many Chinese management staff and highly visible as source of foreign economic domination, these Taiwanese firms may very much have been deliberately attacked by the mobs with implicit government encouragement (as opposed to the standard narrative in the Taiwanese media that the Taiwanese there were "mistaken" for mainland Chinese). It satisfies the Vietnamese government's nationalism appeals while preventing any unnecessary escalations vis-a-vis China.
China would not have problem with this either, in a more sinister note. The Chinese government has been working hard to strengthen its economic leverage over Taiwan, primarily by making Taiwan a sort of economic fringe in Asia that is at simultaneously overly reliant on the Chinese market for survival. By ensuring the destruction of Taiwanese firms outside of China, Chinese government can further prop up the idea that the least risky option for Taiwanese firms to invest outside the island should look at mainland China. Seeing Taiwanese firms get burned outside China only increase Taiwanese dependence on China.
Given the list of interests and fears listed above, both on the Chinese and Vietnamese sides, it can sufficiently be concluded that Taiwanese firms, as a group, are a sacrificial lamb for the betterment of both Sino-Vietnamese relations and Vietnamese government's standing as home. For the Taiwanese audience, it should be clearly understood that neither the Vietnamese or the Chinese government gives a half damn about the sufferings and damages Taiwanese firms suffered in Vietnam, as the diplomatic value of paying niceties to the government in Taipei is calculated to be much much less than the factors noted above.
Only in the last day or so has the Vietnamese authorities stepped in to contain the enraged and violent crowds. For the author's perspective, the progression of events has a couple of interesting points. First is that Taiwanese factories have been taking the brunt of the Vietnamese crowds' wrath, as opposed to, say, those corporate and official institutions of Chinese and ethnic Chinese ownership. Second is that, given the Vietnamese government's tight control over public demonstrations, how the enraged public released the rage might say much about Sino-Vietnamese relations.
As much of a conspiracy theory as it seems (just as the author discussed previously for the Malaysian Airlines flight 370), there is a feeling that the street protests in Vietnam became not what it is organically by, at least partially, directed by the Vietnamese government to proceed in a certain fashion. After all, there has been anti-China protests in the past, but they have been largely under the government's control, so much so that with the government's decision to halt, the crowds seemed to have disappeared quickly. The author does not expect anything differently for this round of anti-China protests.
And let's not for a moment doubt the need for the protests to take place and the anger released. The Vietnamese government, being authoritarian and ideologically confused as it is, must under undertake actions that appeals to popular nationalism. Just as it is the case for the Chinese government, looking tough to neighbors on the issues of border disputes would very much serve this goal. Such domestic political concerns will ensure that the Vietnamese government will tolerate the masses to get violent to a certain extent if the situation remains controllable. Certainly China understands this domestic constraint as well.
But at the same time, the Vietnamese government also has international constraints, most important of which to not enlarge the confrontation with China. As multiple sources have pointed out, Vietnam has neither the economic or military resources to hunker down for a lengthy standoff with China without putting itself in an increasing position of weakness. Given China's equal unwillingness to enlarge the conflict after successfully planting its oil rig, both sides would have had some sort of unwritten compromise to shove the whole incident under the proverbial carpet in the very near future.
And that is where the Taiwanese factories come into the picture. It is almost too perfect to be used as a scapegoat. Hiring many Chinese management staff and highly visible as source of foreign economic domination, these Taiwanese firms may very much have been deliberately attacked by the mobs with implicit government encouragement (as opposed to the standard narrative in the Taiwanese media that the Taiwanese there were "mistaken" for mainland Chinese). It satisfies the Vietnamese government's nationalism appeals while preventing any unnecessary escalations vis-a-vis China.
China would not have problem with this either, in a more sinister note. The Chinese government has been working hard to strengthen its economic leverage over Taiwan, primarily by making Taiwan a sort of economic fringe in Asia that is at simultaneously overly reliant on the Chinese market for survival. By ensuring the destruction of Taiwanese firms outside of China, Chinese government can further prop up the idea that the least risky option for Taiwanese firms to invest outside the island should look at mainland China. Seeing Taiwanese firms get burned outside China only increase Taiwanese dependence on China.
Given the list of interests and fears listed above, both on the Chinese and Vietnamese sides, it can sufficiently be concluded that Taiwanese firms, as a group, are a sacrificial lamb for the betterment of both Sino-Vietnamese relations and Vietnamese government's standing as home. For the Taiwanese audience, it should be clearly understood that neither the Vietnamese or the Chinese government gives a half damn about the sufferings and damages Taiwanese firms suffered in Vietnam, as the diplomatic value of paying niceties to the government in Taipei is calculated to be much much less than the factors noted above.
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